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THE PERILS AND PROMISES OF ARTIFICIAL GENERAL INTELLIGENCE 
Brian S. Haney† 
INTRODUCTION 
Most people think the fusion of man and technology might happen in the 
distant future; the truth is that human beings are already cyborgs.  With a smartphone, 
a human being can quickly answer virtually any question, store limitless 
information in memory, and complete any calculation.1  Modern technology 
companies collect data about humans from smartphones and feed it directly through 
advanced artificial intelligence (“AI”) systems.2  By design, AI systems maximize 
electrical impulses to consumers’ limbic systems, the brain’s reward center, to 
stimulate economic growth and development.3  At the National Governors 
Association’s 2017 Summer Meeting, Elon Musk stated, “[t]he biggest risk that we 
face as a civilization is artificial intelligence.”4  
Musk is not alone; in fact, there is a growing list of scholars and industry 
leaders that have directed attention to the existential threats that AI poses to man.5  
Yet, legal scholarship on the topic of artificial intelligence has either denied or 
relatively ignored the accelerating rate of AI advancement.6  Instead, current legal 
scholarship devoted to AI regulation has encouraged regulators not to be distracted 
by claims of an “AI apocalypse” and to focus their efforts on “more immediate 
harms.”7  In sum, legal scholarship in the field of AI regulation is far behind and 
provides misguided advice to regulators and scholars.8  Indeed, every task humans 
use intelligence to perform is a target for AI automation.9  Further, it has often been 
the case that once an AI system reaches human level performance at a given task, 
shortly thereafter that same AI system exceeds the performance of the most skilled 
†  Brian S. Haney, J.D. Notre Dame Law School 2018, is the Chief Executive Officer of Martian Tech-
nologies.  Special thanks go to LaDarien Harris, Mike Gallagher, Ryan Claudeanos, Delaney Foreman, Maria 
Munoz-Robles, Brian Wongchaowart, Bill Green, Ned Rooney, and the Journal of Legislation. 
1  The Joe Rogan Experience #1169 – Elon Musk, THE JOE ROGAN EXPERIENCE (Sept. 6, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ycPr5-27vSI.  
2  Id. 
3  Id. 
4  Elon Musk at the National Governors Association 2017 Summer Meeting, C-SPAN, 50:00 (July 15, 
2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4676772/elon-musk-national-governors-association-2017-summer-
meeting. 
5  See MILES BRUNDAGE ET AL., THE MALICIOUS USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: FORECASTING, PRE-
VENTION, AND MITIGATION 12 (2018); see also MAX TEGMARK, LIFE 3.0 BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ARTI-
FICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2017). 
6  See Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399, 432 
(2017). 
7  See id. at 431. 
8  See id.  
9  BRUNDAGE ET AL., supra note 5. 
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humans in completing that task.10  Many AI researchers expect that AI systems will 
eventually reach and then exceed human-level performance in all tasks.11 
AI technology is sculpting a future where fake pictures and videos are 
inexpensive, widely available, and indistinguishable from the real thing, which is 
completely reshaping the way in which humans associate truth with evidence.12  Even 
those who doubt whether Artificial General Intelligence (“AGI”), AI capable of 
accomplishing any goal,13 will be created in the future, still agree that AI will have 
profound implications for all domains, including: healthcare, law, and national 
security.14  The purpose of this Article is twofold.  First, this Article defines and 
explains AI’s cutting-edge technology with a specific focus on deep reinforcement 
learning, a breakthrough type of machine learning developed by Google in 2013.15  
Second, this Article identifies three hurdles for regulators to overcome in regulating 
AI.  
This Article contributes to current legal and AI scholarship in three main 
ways.  It is the first to focus on deep reinforcement learning, specifically on the 
existential threats posed by AI and it is the first to engage with the formal models 
that underpin AI.  This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I explains basic terms 
and concepts in AI and explores several practical applications of AI in modern 
industry.  Part II explains deep reinforcement learning, a relatively recent 
breakthrough in AI that many scholars believe provides a path to AGI.  Part III 
explores legal scholarship on the topic of AI regulation and discusses three issues 
regulators must address to develop a strong regulatory framework for AI.  
 
I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
Contemporary scholars have presented several different definitions of AI.  
For example, MIT Professor Max Tegmark concisely defines AI as “non-biological 
intelligence.”16  Google’s Ray Kurzweil has described AI as “the art of creating 
machines that perform functions that require intelligence when performed by 
people.”17  Additionally, according to Stanford Professor Nils Nilsson, AI is 
“concerned with intelligent behavior in artifacts.”18  Generally, and for the purposes 
of this Article, AI refers to the study and development of intelligent machines that 
can replicate the thought processes of human cognitive functions like making 
predictions, speech processes, or playing games. 
While AI includes different categories, two types of AI are most important 
in the context of AI regulation.  The first is narrow AI, also known as weak AI.19  
Narrow AI has the ability to accomplish a limited set of goals20 and is associated with 
attempts to develop AI to improve human intelligence, as opposed to duplicating 
                                                          
10  Id. at 16. 
11  Id.  
12  GREG ALLEN & TANIEL CHAN, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 31 (2017). 
13  TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 31 (2017). 
14  ALLEN & CHAN, supra note 12.  
15  Methods and Apparatus for Reinforcement Learning, U.S. Patent Application No. 14/097,862 (filed 
Dec. 5, 2013) (available at https://patents.google.com/patent/US20150100530A1/en); see also TEGMARK, su-
pra note 5, at 84. 
16  TEGMARK, supra note 5. 
17  RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF INTELLIGENT MACHINES 14 (1992). 
18  NILS J. NILSSON, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A NEW SYNTHESIS 1 (1998). 
19  NILS J. NILSSON, THE QUEST FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 388 (2010). 
20  See TEGMARK, supra note 5.  
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human intelligence.21  The second type of AI is artificial general intelligence 
(“AGI”), also known as strong AI.22  To demonstrate AGI, an AI agent must have the 
ability to accomplish any goal.23  AGI is associated with the claim that a programmed 
computer could be a mind and could think at least as well as humans do.24  Ultimately, 
AGI is the current goal for many AI researchers.25  For example, OpenAI, a non-
profit organization funding pioneering research in the field, states on its website that 
its mission is “[d]iscovering and enacting the path to safe artificial general 
intelligence.”26  Yet, it appears for the time being, that only narrow AI has been 
developed and successfully deployed.27 
 
A. AI IN MODERN PROFESSIONAL INDUSTRIES 
The implementation of narrow AI is disrupting modern industries 
worldwide.28  Even the legal industry is not exempt from this corrosive force.29  
Indeed, technology assisted review (“TAR”) is revolutionizing the discovery process 
and AI is at the forefront of this innovation.30  Litigators are now commonly called 
on by clients to establish e-discovery relevancy hypotheses and to implement 
predictive coding models (a type of TAR) for the discovery of electronic 
information.31  In this process, litigators will first identify keywords to search and 
identify an initial set of documents to be reviewed.32  Then, document review 
attorneys review, code, and score the initial set of documents based on the occurrence 
of certain keywords in relation to a document’s relevance.33  As this review takes 
place, e-discovery attorneys train and model supervised learning algorithms to 
classify documents based upon the document review attorneys’ decisions in 
classifying documents in the initial set of documents.34  In other words, the algorithm 
learns what documents are relevant by analyzing and replicating the decisions of real 
attorneys.35  Additionally, predictive-coding models are capable of classifying 
millions of discoverable documents based on relevance.36 
                                                          
21  See NILSSON, supra note 19, at 388–89.  
22  See NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 23 (2017). 
23  TEGMARK, supra note 5. 
24  NILSSON, supra note 19. 
25  Id.  
26  About OpenAI, OPENAI https://openai.com/about/ (last visited May 10, 2019). 
27  See generally Nick Bostrom, Are You Living in A Computer Simulation?, 53 PHILOSOPHY Q. 211, 243 
(2003). 
28  ALLEN & CHAN, supra note 12; see also HEMANT TANEJA, UNSCALED: HOW AI AND NEW GENERA-
TION OF UPSTARTS ARE CREATING THE ECONOMY OF THE FUTURE 1 (2018). 
29  RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS 11 (2d ed. 2017). 
30  Scott D. Cessar, Christopher R. Opalinski, & Brian E. Calla, Controlling Electronic Discovery Costs: 
Cutting “Big Data” Down to Size, ECKERT SEAMANS (Mar. 5, 2013), https://www.eckertseamans.com/publi-
cations/controlling-electronic-discovery-costs-cutting-big-data-down-to-size; see also Nicholas Barry, Man 
Versus Machine Review: The Showdown Between Hordes of Discovery Lawyers and a Computer-Utilizing Pre-
dictive-Coding Technology, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 343, 344 (2013). 
31  KEVIN D. ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL ANALYTICS 240–42 (2017).  
32  Barry, supra note 30, at 351. 
33  GORDON V. CORMACK & MAURA R. GROSSMAN, EVALUATION OF MACHINE-LEARNING PROTOCOLS 
FOR TECHNOLOGY-ASSISTED REVIEW IN ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 154 (2014), http://plg2.cs.uwater-
loo.ca/~gvcormac/calstudy/study/sigir2014-cormackgrossman.pdf.  
34  Barry, supra note 30, at 354. 
35  Id.  
36  See e.g. ASHLEY, supra note 31, at 250. 
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A second example of an industry that is rapidly evolving due to AI is 
healthcare.37  In another decade, the healthcare industry will look very different from 
today due to AI.38  Currently, AI driven by big data is creating a noticeable shift in 
the practice of medicine from mass-market to personalized care.39  Indeed, medical 
professionals practicing in modern hospitals now store patient data in electronic 
databases with Electronic Healthcare Records (“EHRs”).40  This allows machine-
learning algorithms to analyze patient healthcare data and drastically improve patient 
care.41  These data-driven resources not only allow a doctor to know virtually 
everything about a patient’s medical history without ever meeting the patient, but 
also drastically reduce costs associated with healthcare by assisting in medical 
work.42  For example, in 2016, researchers at Stanford developed AI that was able to 
diagnose lung cancer more accurately than human pathologists.43  Another example 
is D-Wave’s Adiabatic Quantum Computer, which is capable of running machine 
learning algorithms for cancer diagnostics.44  In short, EHRs, big data, and AI are 
transforming the health-care landscape.45  
A third example of AI disruption is occurring in the defense industry.  AI is 
already an essential tool in cybersecurity.46  Admiral Mike Rogers, Director of the 
National Security Administration has argued that AI and machine learning are 
foundational to the future of cyber security.47  On March 2, 2017, a report was issued 
to the White House stating that Russian programmers launched an AI cyber-attack 
on the personal social-media accounts of over 10,000 employees at the Department 
of Defense.48  Additionally, AI is used on the battlefield in modern warfare settings.49  
For example, the U.S. Phalanx missile-defense system for naval ships uses AI to 
detect, track, and attack threats from enemy missiles and aircraft.50  However, 
terrorist misuse of commercial AI systems is a serious problem.51  Terrorist 
organizations are already using AI systems in drones to deliver explosives and cause 
crashes.52  
Narrow AI continues to change the way professional industries such as law, 
healthcare, and defense operate.53  Several AI researchers have cited observable 
                                                          
37  TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 102. 
38  TANEJA, supra note 28, at 73. 
39  Id. 
40  Kate Monica, Apple EHR Patient Data Viewer Now in Use at 39 Health Systems, EHRINTELLIGENCE 
(Apr. 2, 2018), https://ehrintelligence.com/news/apple-ehr-patient-data-viewer-now-in-use-at-39-health-sys-
tems. 
41  See XIAOQIAN JIANG ET AL., A PATIENT-DRIVEN ADAPTIVE PREDICATION TECHNIQUE TO IMPROVE 
PERSONALIZED RISK ESTIMATION FOR CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT 137 (2012).  
42  See Alvin Rajkomar et al., Scalable and Accurate Deep Learning with Electronic Health Records, 
NATURE PARTNER J. (2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41746-018-0029-1.pdf.  
43  See Lloyd Minor, Crunching the Image Data Using Artificial Intelligence to Look at Biopsies, STAN-
FORD MED. (2017), https://stanmed.stanford.edu/2017summer/artificial-intelligence-could-help-diagnose-can-
cer-predict-survival.html. 
44  See Brian S. Haney, Quantum_Machine_Learning_Cancer_Diagnostics, GITHUB (Feb. 24, 2019), 
https://github.com/Bhaney44/Leap/blob/master/Quantum_Machine_Learning_Cancer_Diagnostics.py. 
45  Id. 
46  See generally BRUNDAGE ET AL., supra note 5. 
47  ALLEN & CHAN, supra note 12, at 18. 
48 See Massimo Calbresi, Inside Russia’s Social Media War on America, TIME (May 18, 2017), 
http://time.com/4783932/inside-russia-social-media-war-america/. 
49  See United States Navy Fact File: MK 15 – Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), U.S. DEP’T 
NAVY (last visited May 13, 2019), http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=487&ct=2. 
50  TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 111 (2017). 
51  See generally BRUNDAGE ET AL., supra note 5. 
52  See id. 
53  See generally TEGMARK, supra note 5. 
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patterns in historic information technology price and performance kinetics to 
support the argument that the rate of advancement of AI technologies will happen 
far more rapidly than expected.54  Moreover, these researchers hypothesize AI 
technologies will continue to advance at an accelerating rate.55 
 
B. THE LAW OF ACCELERATING RETURNS 
The Law of Accelerating Returns (“LOAR”) states that fundamental 
measures of information technology will generally follow a predictable and 
exponential trajectory.56  Indeed, information technologies build upon themselves in 
an exponential manner; this phenomenon has been named Moore’s Law and is readily 
measurable in most processes where patterns of information evolve.57  It describes 
the LOAR’s application to the price and performance of computing58 and was 
proposed by Gordon Moore, the founder of Intel, in 1965.59  Moore’s Law predicts 
that every eighteen months, the processing power of computers will double, while 
costs are cut in half.60  It generally represents that the power of information 
technology doubles every one and a half years.61  The past fifty-three years have 
proven Gordon Moore’s prediction correct;62 a smartphone today has more 
computing power than all of NASA had in 1969—when Apollo 11 landed on the 
Moon.63  Applied to AI, Moore’s Law has led many AI researchers to believe that we 
are currently at the cusp of developing super-intelligent AI.64 
Irving J. Good first introduced the concept of superintelligence in 1965.65  
Good stated, “[l]et an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far 
surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever.”66  According to 
Good, “[s]ince the design of machine is one of these intellectual activities, an 
ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then 
unquestionably be an intelligence explosion, and the intelligence of man would be 
left far behind.”67  Indeed, Good predicted that the first ultraintelligent machine 
would be “the last invention that man need ever make.”68  Recent scholars have 
embraced Good’s analysis and have defined superintelligence similarly.  For 
example, Oxford Professor Nick Bostrom defines superintelligence as “any intellect 
that greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of 
interest.”69  Max Tegmark states that superintelligence is “[g]eneral intelligence far 
beyond human level.”70 
                                                          
54  See BOSTROM, supra note 22, at 85. 
55  See RAY KURZWEIL, HOW TO CREATE A MIND 250 (2012). 
56  See id. 
57  See id. at 256. 
58  See MARTINE ROTHBLATT, VIRTUALLY HUMAN 48 (2014). 
59  See KURZWEIL, supra note 55, at 251. 
60  See SUSSKIND, supra note 29, at 11. 
61  See ROTHBLATT, supra note 58, at 28. 
62  See KURZWEIL, supra note 55, at 251. 
63  See MICHIO KAKU, THE PHYSICS OF THE FUTURE 23 (2011). 
64  See generally BOSTROM, supra note 22; see also KURZWEIL, supra note 55; see also TEGMARK, supra 
note 5. 
65  See generally Irving J. Good, Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine, 6 AD-
VANCES IN COMPUTERS 31 (1966). 
66  Id. at 33. 
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
69  BOSTROM, supra note 22, at 22. 
70  See TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 39. 
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The application of the LOAR to AI is evidence that a transition from narrow 
AI to AGI and superintelligence may be much closer than commonly thought.71  For 
now, the earliest estimate of AGI is 2029.72  Indeed, Ray Kurzweil argues that the 
twenty-first century will yield what today may seem like 20,000 years of 
technological progress and innovation because of the LOAR.73  Additionally, 
Bostrom and AI theorist Eliezer Yudkowsky have predicted a public perception of 
rapid kinetics in AI development due to anthropomorphism of AI.74  
Anthropomorphism of AI refers to the ascription of human levels of intelligence to 
non-human entities.75  Humans may consider a village idiot and Albert Einstein 
extreme ends of the intelligence spectrum,76 yet the difference between the two on a 
larger relative scale is actually de minimis.77  Thus, the advancement of an AI system 
from the intelligence of the village idiot, to the intelligence of Einstein, to the 
intelligence of AGI, and finally superintelligence may be faster than expected.78 
Interestingly, these predictions are supported by the massive amount of 
information humans began collecting at the dawn of the digital age.79  Indeed, the 
amount of information humans collect is also accelerating.80  Data, defined as a 
digital representation of information about the world,81 is created at an astounding 
rate.  Every two days, humans create more than five quintillion bytes of data, as much 
data as they did from the dawn of civilization up until 2003.82  
Harvard professor and economist Michael Kremer argues, “the fundamental 
driver of human progress is not raw materials but technological solutions to 
problems.”83  In the context of AI, data is the driving force behind technological 
development instead of human programmers.84  And the driving force of 
technological solutions is the realization that every piece of information can be 
represented as numbers.85  The amount and type of data available for a particular 
problem largely determines the strength of AI systems that can be developed.86  Thus, 
the LOAR will have a profound impact on the development of AI toward AGI and 
superintelligence.  
Yet, some argue that AGI may never happen.87  For example, the late 
Microsoft co-founder, Paul Allen asserts scientific progress is irregular and 
hypothesizes that by the end of the twenty-first century, humans will have yet to 
                                                          
71  See id. at 157. 
72  See KURZWEIL, supra note 55, at 261. 
73  See Ray Kurzweil, The Law of Accelerating Returns, in KURZWEIL NETWORK (2001), http://www.kur-
zweilai.net/the-law-of-accelerating-returns. 
74  See BOSTROM, supra note 22, at 85. 
75  See Eliezer Yudkowsky, Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk, 
MACHINE INTELLIGENCE RES. INST., 21 (2008), https://intelligence.org/files/AIPosNegFactor.pdf. 
76  See BOSTROM, supra note 22, at 85. 
77  See Yudkowsky, supra note 75. 
78  See BOSTROM, supra note 22, at 86. 
79  See ETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING 11 (2016). 
80  See SUSSKIND, supra note 29 at 11. 
81  ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 3.  
82  SUSSKIND, supra note 29, at 11. 
83  Michael Kremer, “Population Growth and Technological Change: One Million B.C. to 1990,” 108 Q. 
J. OF ECON. 3 (1993). (quoting SAIFEDEAN AMMOUS, THE BITCOIN STANDARD: THE DECENTRALIZED ALTER-
NATIVE TO CENTRAL BANKING (2018). 
84  ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 12. 
85  Id.  
86  SEBASTIAN RASCHKA & VAHID MIRJALILI, PYTHON MACHINE LEARNING, 2 (2d. ed. 2017). 
87  Paul G. Allen & Mark Greaves, The Singularity Isn’t Near, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 12, 2011), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/425733/paul-allen-the-singularity-isnt-near/. 
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achieve AGI.88  On the other hand, Max Tegmark suggests that the fundamental truth 
of the debate—whether humanity will ever build AGI—remains uncertain.89  But 
Tegmark also explains that most AI experts project AGI will occur around 2047.90  
As one scholar argues, the questions about AI’s impact will only become more urgent 
as we draw nearer to the exponential inflection point and its growth takes a sudden 
and dramatic vertical trajectory.91  For now, the question is whether society is 
approaching that inflection point or if it is still in the slower gradual development 
phase.92  Today, the clearest path that humanity has toward creating AGI is deep 
reinforcement learning. 
 
II. AGI DEVELOPMENT 
 
Machine learning is a subfield of AI that focuses on the ability of machines to learn 
and replicate cognitive behaviors associated with the human mind.93  Generally, 
machine learning involves data mining, pattern recognition, and natural-language 
processing.94  These techniques have become increasingly popular in recent years 
due to the explosion in the amount of data humans have produced and collected since 
the dawn of the internet.95  The most recent breakthrough in machine learning is deep 
reinforcement learning.96  Deep reinforcement learning combines two traditional 
models of machine learning—supervised learning and reinforcement learning—to 
allow algorithms to learn independently from humans.97  
Most scholarship in AI regulation focuses on either supervised or 
unsupervised methods of machine learning because until 2014, those were the only 
two types of machine learning in popular use.98  Indeed, deep neural networks, a type 
of supervised learning algorithm, are the focus of most legal scholarship.99  However, 
in 2013, Google developed a new type of learning called “deep reinforcement 
learning,” which it subsequently patented.100  Pioneered in the 1980s, reinforcement 
learning is a machine learning technique inspired by behaviorist psychology, where 
an intelligent agent’s tendency to act in a certain way is influenced by a reward 
structure.101  An intelligent agent is an entity that collects information about its 
environment from sensors and then processes that information to decide how to 
respond to its environment.102  Deep reinforcement learning combines reinforcement 
                                                          
88  Id. 
89  TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 54. 
90  Id. at 157. 
91  Michael Guihot et al., Nudging Robots: Innovative Solutions to Regulate Artificial Intelligence, 20 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385, 400 (2017). 
92  See id. 
93  See generally ALPAYDIN, supra note 79. 
94  See Michael Simon et al., Lola v. Skadden and the Automation of the Legal Profession, 20 YALE J.L. 
& TECH 234, 253 (2018) (quoting Bernard Marr, What Everyone Should Know About Cognitive Computing, 
FORBES (Mar. 23, 2016, 3:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/03/23/what-every-
one-should-know-about-cognitive-computing/#5630f9005088. 
95  See id. at 252. 
96  See TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 85.  
97  See id. 
98  See id. at 83. 
99  See generally Calo, supra note 6; see also John O. McGinnis, Accelerating AI, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
1253 (2010). 
100  ’862 Application, supra note 15. 
101  RICHARD S. SUTTON & ANDREW G. BARTO, REINFORCEMENT LEARNING: AN INTRODUCTION 55 
(2017); see also TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 85. 
102  TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 84. 
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learning with the use of deep neural networks.103  Deep reinforcement learning refers 
to a reinforcement-learning algorithm using a deep neural network as a function 
approximator, which will be explained later in this Part.104  First, this Part will explain 
deep neural networks.  Second, this Part will explain reinforcement learning.  Third, 
this Part will explain deep reinforcement learning. 
 
A. DEEP NEURAL NETWORKS 
The human brain is composed of processing units called “neurons.”105  Each 
neuron in the brain is connected to other neurons through structures called 
synapses.106  A biological neuron consists of dendrites—receivers of various 
electrical impulses from other neurons—that are gathered in the cell body of a 
neuron.107  Once the neuron’s cell body has collected enough electrical energy to 
exceed a threshold amount, the neuron transmits an electrical charge to other neurons 
in the brain through synapses.108  This transfer of information in the biological brain 
provides the foundation for the way in which modern neural networks operate.109  
Indeed, artificial neurons are essentially logic gates modeled off of the 
biological neuron.110  Both artificial and biological neurons receive input from 
various sources and map input information to a single output value.111  An artificial 
neural network is a group of interconnected artificial neurons capable of influencing 
each other’s behavior.112  In an artificial neural network, the neurons are connected 
by weight coefficients modeling the strength of synapses in the biological brain.113  
Neural networks are trained using large data sets.114  The training process allows the 
weight coefficients to adjust so that the neural network’s output or prediction is 
accurate.115  After a neural network is trained, new data is fed through the network to 
make predictions.116   
In 1957, Frank Rosenblatt published an algorithm—the perceptron—that 
automatically learns the optimal weight coefficients for an artificial neural 
network.117  The perceptron model is illustrated below:118 
 
                                                          
103  Fei-Fei Li, Justin Johnson, & Serena Yeung, Lecture 14: Deep Reinforcement Learning, STANFORD 
U. SCH. OF ENG’G (2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lvoHnicueoE (last accessed May 13, 2019). 
104  Id. 
105  ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 86. 
106  Id.  
107  RASCHKA & MIRJALILI, supra note 86, at 18. 
108  Id. 
109  ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 86.  
110  KURZWEIL, supra note 55, at 38. 
111  JOHN D. KELLEHER & BRENDAN TIERNEY, DATA SCIENCE 131 (2018). 
112  TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 72. 
113  ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 88. 
114  Id. at 89. 
115  Id.  
116  KELLEHER, supra note 111, at 127. 
117  RASCHKA & MIRJALILI, supra note 86, at 18. 
118  Id. 
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In the perceptron, the three circles on the far left represent the input values 𝑥𝑗…𝑚 and 
the associated weight values 𝑤𝑗…𝑚 are the three circles to the right of the input 
values.119  The input values and the weight values are aggregated, typically with a 
summation equation represented by the first big circle (from left to right).120  The 
second large circle represents the threshold function, a predetermined value that, if 
exceeded, signals an output of 1.121  If the threshold function is not exceeded, the 
model outputs a 0.122  The output is represented by the arrow pointing right.123  The 
box at the top of the model represents an error function.124  In the event that the 
model’s output is incorrect, then the error function is triggered.125  If the error 
function is triggered, the weight values are updated pursuant to the perceptron 
learning rule.126  The formal representation of the perceptron learning rule is defined 
as: ∆𝑤𝑗 = 𝜂(𝑦
(𝑖) − ?̂?𝑖)𝑥𝑗
(𝑖)
, where 𝜂 is the learning rate, 𝑦(𝑖) is the true class label of 
the ith training sample, and ?̂?𝑖 is the predicted class label.127  The true class label is 
the output label, and the predicted class label is the perceptron’s output.128  
Every neural network has an input layer and an output layer.129  However, in 
between the input and output layer, neural networks contain multiple hidden 
layers.130  The number of hidden layers may vary and is dependent on the particular 
model.131  It is important to note that while perceptron models are generally limited 
to linear classification tasks, this restriction does not apply to multi-layer networks.132  
Indeed, a multi-layer perceptron model is a universal approximator, which is an 
algorithm that can approximate any function with desired accuracy given enough 
neurons.133  A deep neural network is a network that has multiple hidden layers.134  
This allows the neural network to account for several layers of abstraction.135  The 
illustration below is a simple model of a deep neural network.136   
                                                          
119  Id. at 19. 
120  See ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 89. 
121  See Id.  
122  See RASCHKA & MIRJALILI, supra note 86, at 18. 
123  See KURZWEIL, supra note 55, at 132. 
124  See RASCHKA & MIRJALILI, supra note 86, at 18. 
125  See ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 90. 
126  See id. 
127  See RASCHKA & MIRJALILI, supra note 86, at 21. 
128  See id. at 22. 
129  See KURZWEIL, supra note 55, at 132. 
130  See ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 100. 
131  See KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 111, at 132. 
132  See ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 99. 
133  See id. 
134  See TEGMARK, supra note 5, at 76. 
135  ALPAYDIN, supra note 79, at 88. 
136  KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 111, at 132 (model based on illustration at the following citation). 
 




Each neuron represents a hidden unit in a layer and defines a complex feature of the 
model.137  Hidden units correspond to hidden attributes defined in terms of what is 
observed, but not directly observed.138  And the successive layers of hidden units 
correspond to increasing layers of feature abstraction.139  
Indeed, each layer of hidden units acts as a feature extractor by providing 
analysis of slightly more complicated features.140  Feature extraction is a method of 
dimensionality reduction—a method of decreasing input attributes—that allows raw 
input to be converted into output in a manner that allows data scientists to observe 
hidden features in data.141  The later hidden units extract hidden features by 
combining the previous features in a slightly larger part of the input space.142  The 
output layer observes the whole input to produce a final prediction.143  In other words, 
deep neural networks learn more complicated functions of their initial input when 
each hidden layer combines the values of the preceding layer.144  Additionally, deep 
neural networks have proven to be excellent for making predictions in several 
contexts.145  However, these models require data to learn and at least a minimal 
amount of human intervention to supervise the learning process.146  Reinforcement 
learning is a newer machine learning technique that requires neither.147 
 
B.   DEEP REINFORCEMENT LEARNING 
Reinforcement learning is a type of machine learning technique inspired by 
behaviorist psychology.148  Formally, reinforcement learning is described through an 
agent-environment interaction, with the Markov Decision Process (“MDP”).149  The 
model below describes the agent-environment interaction in an MDP.150 
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The environment is made up of states for each point in time in which the environment 
exists.151  The agent’s actions in each state determine the probabilistic evolution of 
the environment.152  
Initially, the agent is presented with a state of the environment, which 
includes several possible actions.153  Then, the agent takes an action in the state and 
advances to the next state of the environment, where a reward is returned.154  The 
agent chooses which action to take when presented with a state based upon the 
agent’s policy.155  A policy is the way in which an agent makes decisions or chooses 
actions within a state.156  For example, a person with a high amount of integrity has 
a policy that routinely guides their decision making to choose to do the right thing 
when faced with ethical dilemmas.  Similarly, a greedy person has a policy that 
routinely guides their decision making to choose the action returning the highest 
dollar value.  The goal of the policy is to allow the agent to advance through the 
environment so as to maximize a reward.157  
A value-function defines the value of being in a state s and following a policy 
𝜋 until the final state of the environment, which is called the terminal state.158  The 
terminal state concludes the episode, which is made up of all of the states in an 
environment.159  The expected value of executing a policy 𝜋 given state s is denoted 
as 𝑉𝜋(𝑠). 160  In the context of a MDP, the value function 𝑉𝜋 is equal to the expected 
sum of the discounted rewards for executing policy 𝜋:161  
 
𝑉𝜋(𝑠)  = E[𝑅(𝑠0) + 𝛾𝑅(𝑠1) + ⋯ |𝑠0 = 𝑠, 𝜋(𝑠)] 
The expected future rewards are discounted with a discount factor 𝛾.162  The discount 
factor is typically defined: 0 < 𝛾 < 1.163  This allows the value function to be defined 
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in finite terms and allows the value of present rewards to be more valuable than future 
rewards.164  The optimal policy 𝜋∗(𝑠) is defined as the policy that maximizes the 
expected value relative to other policies.165  The objective of the MDP model is to 
find the optimal policy:166 
 
𝜋∗(𝑠) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 max
𝜋
𝑉𝜋(𝑠) 
The problem of finding the optimal policy for a given MDP is commonly 
solved with Q-learning.167  Q-learning solves this problem by maximizing a Q-value 
function: Q(𝑠, 𝑎).168  A Q-value function describes the value of a state-action pair.169  
Indeed, the goal of a Q-learning algorithm is to discover the optimal Q-value function 
𝑄∗ for any state-action pair.170  The Bellman equation expresses the relationship 
between the value of a state and the values of its successor states.171  The algorithm 
continues perpetually until the convergence of the Q-value function.172  The 
convergence of the Q-value function represents 𝑄∗ and satisfies the Bellman 
Equation, defined as:173 
𝑄∗(𝑠, 𝑎) = 𝔼𝑠′~𝜀 [𝑟 + 𝛾 max
𝑎′
𝑄∗(𝑠′, 𝑎′)|𝑠, 𝑎] 
An agent’s optimal policy 𝜋∗ corresponds to taking the action in each state defined 
by 𝑄∗.174  However, one issue that arises is that the value of 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎) must be computed 
for every state-action pair, which may be computationally infeasible.175  For example, 
computing the value of every state-action pair, where the raw input is pixels in an 
Atari game, would require tremendous computational power.176  One solution is to 
use a function approximator to estimate the Q-value function:177 
𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎; ∅) ≈ (𝑠, 𝑎) 
Here, ∅ represents the function parameters.178  And if ∅ is determined by a Deep 
Neural Network, the algorithm is a deep reinforcement learning algorithm called a 
Deep Q-Network (“DQN”).179 
A DQN is a deep learning model that combines a Deep Neural Network 
(“DNN”) with a Q-learning algorithm.180  The DQN uses experience replay to 
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maintain a buffer of old experiences of the algorithm to train a neural network.181  An 
experience consists of an observed state-action pair, the immediate reward obtained, 
and the next state observed.182  “An agent’s experience at a time step t is denoted et 
and is a tuple (st, at, rt, st+1) consisting of the current state st, the chosen action at, the 
reward rt, and the next state st+1.”183  The experiences for all the time steps are stored 
in a replay memory, over many episodes, and are used to train the DNN.184  The 
DNN’s output corresponds to one valid action because the DNN serves as an 
approximator for the Q-value function.185  Thus, after a feedforward pass of the 
network, the outputs are the estimated Q-values of the state-action pair.186  This 
allows the algorithm to generalize from collected data of past experiences.187  Indeed, 
according to MIT Professor Max Tegmark, “deep reinforcement learning is a 
completely general technique.”188  
 
III. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE REGULATION 
 
Legal scholarship on the threat of AI is divided into two distinct camps.189  
One camp recognizes the potential threats posed by malicious and reckless use of AI, 
and the other argues an AI apocalypse is merely the talk of science fiction.190  Neither 
of these camps truly grapple with the existential threats AI poses with the sense of 
immediacy required to prevent disaster.191  First, this Part will discuss the arguments 
associated with the notion that AI poses no threat to humanity.  Next, this Part will 
discuss arguments that have advanced scholarship in AI regulation to mirror the 
concerns of industry leaders.  Lastly, this Part will address three ongoing and 
unanswered questions in AI regulation.  
Scholars who argue an AI apocalypse is merely science fiction are wrong.192  
These scholars are represented by one in particular—John McGinnis—who notes, 
“the existential dread of machines that become uncontrollable by humans and the 
political anxiety about machines’ destructive power on a revolutionized battlefield” 
are overblown.193  Indeed, McGinnis attributes the problems associated with AGI to 
an error in thinking, where humans anthropomorphize AI and cause the mistaken fear 
that AGI will necessarily reflect human malevolence.194  Thus, McGinnis suggests 
the possibility of friendly AI and encourages disposing of the assumption that AI 
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must have willpower like a human.195  He supposes that a lack of willpower should 
negate the fear surrounding evil AI.196  
Interestingly, the anthropomorphic argument cuts both ways.  In fact, Nick 
Bostrom and Eliezer Yudkowsky have convincingly made the anthropomorphic 
argument to explain why human beings will drastically underestimate the 
advancement of AI.197  Bostrom and Yudkowsky argue that there will be a public 
perception of rapid kinetics in AI development due to human anthropomorphism of 
AI.198  Again, human anthropomorphism of AI refers to the ascription of human 
levels of intelligence to non-human entities.199  As illustrated by the comparison in 
Part I of Einstein and the village idiot, the difference between levels of intelligence 
on a larger relative scale is de minimis.200  Thus, the advancement of AI to AGI and 
superintelligence, will be faster than expected because the difference in the two levels 
of intelligence on a broader scale is much narrower than humans realize.201  
A second legal scholar, Ryan Calo, more bluntly argues that AI does not 
present an existential threat to humanity and that AGI is merely the “stuff of graphic 
novels.”202  Further, Calo contends that “devoting disproportionate attention and 
resources to the AI apocalypse has the potential to distract policymakers from 
addressing AI’s more immediate harms. . . .”203  He argues nothing in the field of 
machine learning suggests that humanity will soon be capable of modeling 
mammalian, let alone human intelligence.204  This claim is patently misguided.  
Indeed, reinforcement learning and Markov Decision Processes quite literally model 
the human cognitive functions of decision making, rational agency, and 
intelligence.205  Additionally, exponential increases in data production, computing 
power, and global GDP all lend support to the conclusion that AGI will arrive sooner 
than humans think.206 
Therefore, the existential threat that AGI poses to mankind is an immediate 
harm.  This threat is not analogous to a terminator-like robot taking over the world.  
Instead, this threat is the product of AGI developed from deep reinforcement learning 
agents.207  Once AGI level agents are created, they will rapidly have the ability to 
improve their software architecture more efficiently than any human.  These agents 
will be capable of accomplishing any goal correlated with a reward system in a virtual 
environment.  Deep reinforcement learning systems are already capable of 
controlling missiles, rockets, cars, and aircraft.208  And, the software for these 
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applications is open sourced.209  So, today everyone with internet access also has 
potential access to the most sophisticated weapons control systems on the planet.210   
And yet, legal scholarship completely ignores this unavoidable truth.  But, 
some legal scholars have taken steps in the right direction without specifically 
addressing the issue of regulating AGI.  For example, Matthew Scherer argues the 
starting point for regulating AI should be a statute establishing the general principles 
of AI regulation.211  He proposes the Artificial Intelligence Development Act 
(“AIDA”), which would create an agency tasked with certifying the safety of AI 
systems.212  The agency would be required to promulgate rules defining AI.213  The 
main idea is that AIDA would delegate the substantive task of assessing the safety of 
AI systems to an independent agency staffed by specialists, thus insulating decisions 
about the safety of specific AI systems from the pressures exerted by electoral 
politics.214  
Other scholarship discusses different regulatory frameworks that can be 
applied to analyze issues in AI as they arise, as well as a few concrete examples of 
problems in AI regulation.215  The piece convincingly argues that AI, “no matter its 
potential, should be carefully handled.”216  Its authors advocate for a nuanced, 
responsive, and adaptive regulatory framework to foster innovation.217  While limited 
progress has been made in the field of AI regulation, the rapid growth of research in 
intelligent-machine ethics and safety has not brought real progress.218  As one piece 
notes, “[t]he great majority of published papers do little more than argue about which 
of the existing schools of ethics, built over centuries to answer the needs of human 
society, would be the right one to implement in our artificial progeny.”219  Further, 
even the more progressive scholarship in this field focuses quasi-exclusively on 
narrow AI rather than AGI.220  Thus, none of the regulatory frameworks proposed by 
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A. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN AGI DEVELOPMENT 
Experts suspect cyber-attackers will soon begin implementing strategies that use 
deep reinforcement learning agents to craft attacks that current technical defense 
systems are incapable of preventing.221  Indeed, one scholar specifically details 
guidelines for the development of malicious AI software.222  The scholarship was 
written to demonstrate that it is practically possible to develop machine learning 
algorithms that are capable of harming humans.223  Additionally, humans today 
already have the power to destroy life on planet Earth with the use of nuclear 
weapons, and an AGI would certainly have the same capability.224  Modern AI 
scholars analogize the process of building AGI, specifically deep reinforcement 
agents, to the building of nuclear weapons.225  This Part proceeds by identifying three 
specific issues that any adequate regulatory framework for AI would need to 
accommodate. 
The first issue is the competition problem.  If regulators attempt to provide 
oversight to companies developing AGI, then this oversight will stifle innovation and 
will allow countries like China and Russia to develop AGI before the United 
States.226  Indeed, there is a strong possibility that any entity that creates AGI will 
have a decisive advantage over the rest of the world.227   
For example, DQN algorithms are commonly used to trade stocks, where an 
agent is able to take the actions of buying, selling, or holding a stock in each given 
state.228  The agent’s goal is to maximize the value of a portfolio.229  The use of DQN 
algorithms for portfolio management has been successful.230  If an entity could create 
AGI, then it could be used to create an agent capable of manipulating markets in a 
way that would allow a single actor to garner extraordinary amounts of wealth over 
a minimal period of time.231  This would allow such an entity to evolve to become a 
unified central power of authority unbeknownst to the masses.232 
The competition problem becomes even more daunting considering the 
major players in AI today are publicly traded companies.  Companies like Google, 
Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft are some of the biggest players in AI development, 
and their technology is rapidly increasing in power and scalability.233  The power 
disparity between these corporate actors, foreign governments, and the United States 
poses further problems for regulators.234  If the federal government begins regulating 
AI, it must be wary that slowing the pace of progress domestically will surely put the 
United States at a disadvantage against foreign actors.  The ultimate issue of the 
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competition problem is that regulators are faced with a balancing of interests between 
security and freedom.  If regulators place a heavier emphasis on security, they do so 
at the expense of the freedom that has allowed domestic industry leaders in 
technology to innovate.  On the other hand, if regulators place a heavier emphasis on 
freedom, they do so at the expense of the security of the electorate.  Therefore, 
regulators must design a framework that is sensitive to the competition between 
corporations, foreign governments, and national-security agencies. 
The second issue regulators face is the “lone-wolf” concept in which a threat 
is viewed as an isolated incident as opposed to a broad societal issue.  In many ways, 
regulating AI is analogous to the regulation of mathematics or computer science.  
Indeed, AI research requires only a personal computer.235  Interestingly, scholars are 
torn as to the size of a potential project to develop AGI.236  One scholar notes that the 
path to AGI could be achieved as part of a massive government project from the work 
of a small group or even the work of single individual.237  The scale of the path to 
AGI in large part depends on the methods used to achieve AI.238  For example, if the 
current methods of whole-brain emulation are employed it is likely that massive 
amounts of code will need to be developed by expert computer scientists and 
engineers to develop AGI.239  It is important to note that while a project itself may be 
massive in scale, the individual group tasked with making the breakthrough from AI 
to AGI may be very small.240  For example, the Manhattan Project employed roughly 
130,000 people at its peak.241  Yet the atomic bomb was created by a smaller group 
of scientists and engineers, led by J. Robert Oppenheimer and General Leslie Groves 
at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory.242 
Another issue of the lone-wolf problem will manifest if the field of AI experiences a 
breakthrough by a single individual.  In which case, it is possible that everything we 
currently know about AI could fall by the wayside.  Science is no stranger to simple 
yet revolutionary breakthroughs that radically alter the way in which humankind 
understands the natural world.243  Yet, one scholar argues it is likely that regulatory 
bodies could be aware of most people potentially capable of developing AGI.244  
Although it should be noted that an epiphany in AI, like that of Einstein’s in physics 
expressed in the Annus Mirabilis papers, should not be ruled out of the realm of 
possibility.  Therefore, it is possible that a single individual could be the first to create 
AGI and could shortly thereafter attain an unprecedented degree of power.245  
Regulators will need to design a framework that allows for the implementation of 
technology to identify and prevent lone-wolf AGI attacks and threats. 
The third issue technology regulators face is the control problem.  The control 
problem can be analyzed through a principal agent framework in two distinct ways.246  
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The first framework exists where there is a project sponsor acting as a principal and 
a group of scientists and engineers acting as agents of the project sponsor.247  In this 
framework, the control problem manifests if the scientists and engineers developing 
AGI use the knowledge and information they gain in the course of their work for 
malicious purposes.248  For example, as a result of their respective companies’ AI 
development, researchers at Apple, Google, and Facebook have gained immense 
power249 and the capability of developing or altering advanced AI systems for their 
own personal gain or to the detriment of others.  
In the second framework, the principal is the human creator and the agent is the AI 
system.250  In this framework, the control problem manifests if an AGI system is 
developed and its actions are uncontrollable by its creator.251  Several different 
methods of containing AGI have been presented.  For example, Nick Bostrom has 
proposed boxing methods to subdivide and contain AGI’s access to information.252  
Additionally, Max Tegmark has suggested the creation of a “Gatekeeper AI,” a 
superintelligence with the goal of interfering as little as necessary to prevent the 
creation of another superintelligence, is possible.253  Therefore, regulators will need 
to design a framework that controls the way in which AI researchers use their power 
and a framework which allows for the regulation of AGI systems, so they can be 
controlled by human actors. 
In sum, three major problems faced by AI regulators are competition, the 
lone-wolf concept, and control.  One practical way in which these problems may be 
addressed practically is with self-regulating AGI technology.254  In essence, this will 
require the programming of AGI values in alignment with the values of the AGI’s 
creator.255  One major benefit of this solution is that it allows for public regulators to 
stay relatively in the dark regarding how AI technology works.256  However, there 
are two major outstanding issues with this solution.  First, if there is an AGI system 
capable of regulating all other AI systems, there will need to be a regulatory 
mechanism to contain the regulatory AGI so that it does not become a unified power 
with control over humans.  Second, humanity must ensure that the regulatory AGI is 
not outmatched or overpowered by any other AI or AGI.  Indeed, if there was an AGI 
capable of improving itself, the abilities of any human programmer would be swiftly 
left far behind, while Irving J. Good’s infamous words, “…the last invention that man 




There is a spectrum of possibility laid out in scholarship.  On one end are 
those who argue that AI will forever change human life in the near future, and on the 
other are those who argue an AI apocalypse is merely science fiction.  The truth is 
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that neither camp fully understands AGI or the impacts it could have on our world.258  
At the time of his death in 1988, Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman’s 
blackboard contained the words “[w]hat I cannot create, I do not understand.”259  It 
follows that until mankind creates AGI, it is beyond the comprehension of mankind.  
This reality poses an ironic fate for humankind.  Indeed, humanity must first 
understand AGI to control it, yet humans cannot understand AGI until it is created.  
Further, according to Max Tegmark, “we have no idea what will happen if humanity 
succeeds in building human-level AG.”260  Thus, we cannot take for granted that the 
outcome will be positive if AGI is created.261  Indeed, the general consensus in the 
field of AI is that no set of rules is capable of controlling the totality of what AGI 
regulation requires.262  But no matter how many patterns can be recognized and trends 
can be traced, the future of AI will not happen on its own.263  
Most people think that the past has a deterministic relationship with the 
future, but the truth is that the future is fundamentally uncertain.264  Since the early 
twentieth century, humanity has possessed conclusive evidence that the entirety of 
the space-time that humans perceive in their everyday experience only exists relative 
to an individual’s subjective observation.265  And, in quantum physics, as well as at 
the center of black holes, the laws of classical physics and the laws of space-time 
breakdown completely.266  This is important because without space-time at a 
fundamental level of existence, the independence of massive particles evaporates and 
the forward flow of time humans perceive ceases to exist.267  This is evidenced by 
the principles of superposition, non-locality, time-symmetry, and quantum 
entanglement.268  Indeed, the future, as well as the past, exists in a fundamental state 
of quantum uncertainty.  AI is the key to maximizing the probability of prosperity in 
the face of such uncertainty.  Thus, we need to immediately work to create a safe and 
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Summary of Notation 
Notation Meaning270 
𝑄∗(𝑠, 𝑎) Value of taking action a under the 
optimal policy 
𝛾 Discount factor 
𝔼[𝑥] Expectation of random variable 
𝑎𝑟𝑔 max
𝑎
𝑓(𝑎) A value of a, at which 𝑓(𝑎) takes its 
maximal value. 
𝑟 Reward  
𝑠𝑡 State at time t 
𝜋 Policy 
𝜋∗ Optimal policy 
𝑉𝜋(𝑠) Expected value of executing policy 
from a given state. 
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